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COMMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - RACIAL D1s-
CRIMINATION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE* -Constitutional his-
tory from the 1857 Dred Scott decision1 to the 1954 Brown de-
cision2 records "a movement from status to contract"3 for the 
American Negro. Although uncertainty clouds the definition of 
"state action,"4 the civil rights of the Negro under the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment have been clearly 
established.5 The Negro citizen has arrived; 6 the Negro mi-
nority group remains one of the gravest social problems7 of 
twentieth century America. De facto school segregation,8 limited 
• This comment is a revision of a paper awarded second place in the 1960 Broomfield 
Essay Competition. - Ed. 
1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
2 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
s "[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from 
status to contract." MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 141 (World's Classic ed. 1946). 
4 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Pennsylvania 
v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 
351 U.S. 292 (1956); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 348 U.S. 880 (1954), 
vacated, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (certiorari improvidently granted); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 
461 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
GREENBERG, RAcE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAw 46-61 (1959); St. Antoine, Color Blind• 
ness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and Private 
Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and 
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. I (1959); Clark, 
Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 
YALE L.J. 979 (1957); Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. 
REv. 212 (1956); Note, 47 VA. L. REv. 105 (1961); Comment, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 774 (1958). 
5 Cf. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 4, at vii. 
6 However, the problems of enforcing many of these rights such as the right to vote 
and right to attend public schools which are not discriminatorily segregated should not 
be minimized. See U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REI'oRT (1959) [hereinafter cited 1959 
REPORT]; GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 208-74, 133-53. Nevertheless vindication of 
these rights seem inevitable despite the protest of those who have not accepted Martin 
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), much less Brown. See BLOCH, STATES' 
RIGHTS: THE LAW OF THE LAND (1958); KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES (1957). 
7 "A social problem ••• [is] any difficulty or misbehavior of a fairly large number of 
persons which we wish to remove or correct .••. " Frank, Social Problems, 30 AM. J. Soc. 
462 (1925), in HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 1043 (1938). 
s De facto school segregation is segregation without legally-sanctioned discrimination. 
It results normally from the segregated housing pattern which exists in all cities. However, 
it would be naive not to realize that administrators can achieve this result by deciding 
where to build schools or to draw districts. Although this latter action is unconstitutional 
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economic opportunity,9 and inadequate housing1° are problems 
not solved by invocation of the fourteenth amendment11 or incan-
tation of the Declaration of Independence.12 Solution, if any there 
is to be, must come either through the activity of private interests 
in society or through the exercise of the police power of the state. 
In either event the fourteenth amendment, while remaining im-
portant as a conserver of values already established, will decline 
in importance as a creative force.13 Through an analysis of a 
limited but important social problem - the lack of adequate14 
if proved [Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
1006 (1956)], "the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment 
do not affirmatively command integration ..•• " Borders v. Rippy, 247 F,2d 268, 271 
(5th Cir. 1957). Accord, Avery v. Wichita Falls, Ind., School Dis., 241 F.2d 230 (5th 
Cir. 1957); Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957). 
9 In 1954 the median annual income among white families was $4,339 while among 
non-white families it was $2,410. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current 
Population Report, Consumer Income Series, P-60, No. 20, at 11 (1955). Moreover, 
the discrepancy becomes greater among those with college education. GINZBERG, THE 
NF.CRO POTENTIAL 38 (1956). However, from 1940 to 1950, the average Negro income 
increased three times as fast as white income. Gillette, A Study of the Effects of Negro 
Invasion on Real Estate, 16 AM. J. EcoN. 151 (1957). 
10 In 1950 over ten million non-farm units were dilapidated or lacked running water. 
Negro sub-standard housing was six times as great as white. AllRAMs, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 
72-74 (1955). See generally 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 336·97 (1959). Moreover, there 
was less housing per capita in 1950 than in 1940 or 1900. BEYER, HousrNG: A FACTUAL 
ANALYSIS 57 (1958). From 1950 to 1956 only ,6% of new housing built in New York City 
was occupied by Negroes and substantially the same percentages prevailed in the other 
major northern cities. FHA, TRENDS IN OCCUPIED DWELLING UNrrs (1959), in McGhee &: 
Ginger, The House I Live In, 46 CoRNELL L.Q. 194, 250 n. 250 (1961). 
11 See, e.g., "If certain Americans, because of their color [or] race ••• [are denied] 
equal opportunities to have good homes and good neighborhoods • . . the promise of the 
Constitution ••• is not really being fulfilled." Rockefeller in 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, 
at 335. See also, U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 3 (1947). 
12 "The key [to the race problem] is in the Declaration of Independence." Wriston, 
The Individual, in U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON NATIONAL GOALS, GOALS FOR AMERICANS 
35, 42 (1960). "Exclusion from residence area is, thus, a deprivation of a traditional 
American freedom ..•• " REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON RACE AND HOUSING, WHERE SHALL 
WE LIVE 1 (1958). "The opportunity to compete for housing of one's choice is crucial to 
both equality and freedom." Id. at 3. 
18 To this rather bold statement two reservations must be made. If the Supreme 
Court were to overrule the state action limitation enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3 (1883), the fourteenth amendment might then be instrumental in removing 
private discrimination. Secondly, if the United States were to become more socialistic, 
the right to a job or house might become a privilege of federal citizenship. Cf. Interna-
tional Declaration of Human Rights Art. 23, 25, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 3d Sess. (1), 
Resolutions 71, (A/810) (1948). 
14 See note 10 supra. 
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interracial15 housing for middle-class Negroes16 -this comment 
will attempt to develop a rationale to justify the use of the state's 
police power17 generally in solving social problems resulting 
from private race discrimination and to suggest a viable form in 
which that power may be exercised. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE POLICE POWER 
Orthodox legal theory regards the power of the state to make 
and enforce laws to be inherent in the nature of sovereignty.18 
The raison d'etre, but not the limit, of this power is to promote 
"the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and the subjects 
of the same."19 Whatever limitation there may be on that power 
15 Even so astute an observer as Greenberg tends to blur the distinction between 
segregation and slums so that the evil in one justifies eliminating the other. GREENBERG, 
op. cit. supra note 4, at 275. More crusading writers equate the two. See, e.g., REPORT OF 
THE COMM'N ON RACE AND HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE (1958). In addition to the 
logical inconsistency in the equation, the experience in Atlanta demonstrates that segre-
gated housing may be other than the "dingy, overcrowded slum," of McGhee &: Ginger, 
supra note 10, at 194. See 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 419-29. Also the statistic that 
14.6% of new homes in Atlanta were occupied by Negroes as compared to .6% for New 
York, .7% for Philadelphia, and 1.4% for Detroit is revealing. McGhee &: Ginger, supra 
note 10, at 250. Nevertheless, this comment is concerned only with finding realizable 
means to provide interracial housing because of its many advantages. For such advantages, 
see authorities cited above and those in 2 EMERSON &: HABER, PoLmCAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1197-262 (2d ed. 1958). Ultimately, however, the objection to segre-
gation is that it "produces an artificial situation in which inferior standards of excellence 
and efficiency are set up. Since the Negro is not required to compete in the larger world 
and to assume its responsibilities and suffer its penalties, he does not have the opportunity 
to mature." FRAZIER, NEGRO Yourn AT THE CROSSWAYS 290 (1940). 
16 The comment is limited to middle-class Negroes for two reasons: (1) Since they are 
financially able to buy adequate homes, improvement can be made within the framework 
of existing economic values. (2) Negroes who have gained economic security are not only 
the ones who chafe most at being segregated, but they also are generally "the emanciapted, 
the mobile, the restless, the lucky [and] the talented," who are most likely to meet the 
challenge of an interracial milieu. Lewis &: Hill, Desegregation, Integration, and the 
Negro Community, 304 ANNALS 116, 120 (1956). 
17 There is, however, a type of state activity other than that discussed in this com-
ment. Many Northern and Western states have passed anti-bias legislation which makes 
it unlawful for various classes of dealers in real estate to discriminate in employment or 
housing. In addition, state agencies are created to enforce these laws. There is much 
current literature devoted to the wisdom, constitutionality, operation, and efficacy of the 
laws and these agencies. See, e.g., McGhee &: Ginger, supra note 10; Notes, 74 HARv. L. 
REv. 526 (1961); 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv, 758 (1960); 107 U. PA. L. REv, 515 (1958-59). 
Most people concerned with the problem of Negro housing are enthusiastic and optimistic, 
but as yet the agencies "are not making many gains in housing itself." Abrams in 1959 
REPORT, note 6 supra, at 403. 
18 License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847). For simplicity of analysis, textual 
treatment is confined to the states of the union. However, much of what is said concerning 
state action applies with equal force to the federal government, and authorities are some-
times taken from cases upholding federal action. Of course, orthodox theory attributes 
federal power to its delegation by the Constitution. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819). 
19 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 
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apart from that imposed by the federal constitution,20 it is quite 
clear that the state's police power can not validate "laws or 
ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the federal 
constitution."21 Therefore, any proposal which advocates the use 
of this power should show a situation in society which is properly 
the concern of the state and a plan of action which will at once 
ameliorate the situation and be consonant with the mandate of 
the constitution and more particularly its fourteenth amendment. 
The scope of the police power is generally coterminous with 
the functions it is thought the state should serve.22 In the late 
nineteenth century a "nightwatchman" concept of the state dom-
inated political and legal thinking:23 "The utmost possible liberty 
to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his 
property, is both the limitation and duty of government."24 In so 
far as this theory sought to restrict the power of the state over eco-
nomic affairs and to prohibit any infringement of vested property 
interest, "all of this is now demolished and discredited doctrine."25 
The function of the state, according to most contemporary 
American thinkers, is to act affirmatively to eliminate the con-
ceived ills of society.26 Thus maximum hour27 and minimum 
wage28 standards, social security,29 price regulation of certain 
industries,30 rent control,31 regulation of economic competition,82 
zoning laws,33 and laws to increase the supply of housing,84 to 
U.S. 27 (1885); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 
U.S. 525 (1949). 
20 See, e.g., Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 
6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1931). 
21 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
22 National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905); Lincoln Federal Labor 
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949). Berman v. Parker, 
1148 U.S. 26 (1954). 
23 For an attempted explanation of how Herbert Spencer's Social Statics was incorpo-
rated into the fourteenth amendment, see TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1942). 
24 Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brewer). 
25 Kauper, Supreme Court; Trends in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155, 
175 (1959). 
26 See, e.g., RoS'rOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM (1959). 
27 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism 
in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1916). 
28 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
20 See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
30 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (milk industry). 
31 See Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948). 
32 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
83 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
34 See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. 
denied, !139 U.S. 981 (1950). 
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name a few, are considered legitimate governmental responses to 
specific social problems. There is little likelihood that this con-
ception of government will atrophy in the foreseeable future. 
IL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS SOCIAL PROBLEM 
In such an atmosphere no difficulty is incurred in demonstrat-
ing that lack of adequate housing for Negroes is a legitimate 
concern of the state. The existence and nature of the state's 
concern is summarized in the preamble to New York City's Fair 
Housing Ordinance: 
"[M]any persons have been compelled to live in circum-
scribed sections under substandard, unhealthful, unsanitary 
and crowded living conditions because of discrimination and 
segregation in housing. These conditions have caused in-
creased mortality, morbidity, delinquency, risk of fire, inter-
group tension, loss of tax revenue and other evils.35 As a re-
sult, the peace, health, safety and general welfare of the entire 
city and all its inhabitants are threatened."36 
If due allowance is made for the traditional hyperbole of legisla-
tive preambles, the accuracy of these assertions is fully substan-
tiated by intensive sociological investigation37 and has not lately 
been a subject of serious dispute. 
It is unfortunate, but not altogether surprising, that although 
there is virtual unanimity regarding the existence of the problem, 
proposed solutions are not received even with equanimity. 
Whether the proposal is for the construction of minority housing 
on the one hand,38 or broad compulsory anti-bias legislation on 
the other,89 debate is permeated with invectives, a priori absolutes 
and moralism40 - a style reminiscent of early worker-capitalist 
35 Among other evils may be mentioned the decline of the inner core of the city and 
a possible shift in political power. See Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, Scientific Amer-
ican, Oct. 1957, p. 33. 
36 Preamble to New York City, N.Y., Code X41-1.0 (Supp. 1960). 
37 See 2 EMERSON & HABER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1199-209 and authorities therein 
cited. 
38 The NAACP's reply to a proposal for a great increase in the supply of minority 
housing is characteristic: "We do not want jim-crow dwellings whether they are new or 
old." REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON RACE AND HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE 57 (1958). 
39 See, e.g., Avins, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an Infringement on Freedom of 
Choice, 6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960). 
40 See, e.g., Vance, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Choice in New York State, 
46 CORNELL L.Q. 290 (1961); Gruenberg, Dixie Hate in Yankee Suburb, 190 NATION 47 
(1960). See generally, .ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS passim (1955). 
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clashes41 and even earlier religious denominational conflicts.42 
Despite the mace-clanking aura of contention, it seems disagree-
ment may properly be reduced to two issues: what ultimate goal 
should the state strive to realize, and what effect has interracial 
housing on other recognized social values. 
Even among the more serious works, debate over goals tends 
to revolve around the chicken-egg puzzle of prejudice and dis-
crimination.43 The puzzle divides the field into those who think 
it is necessary first to eliminate prejudice and those who think it 
is necessary first to prohibit discrimination.44 In either case there 
seems to be agreement that elimination of the primordial cause, 
not patchwork improvement on the resulting social problem, is 
the proper goal of the state.45 
To the political mind not otherwise addicted to radicalism,46 
another attitude should prevail. The goal of the state should not 
be the eradication of individual discrimination or prejudice, even 
if this were possible; the goal should be to neutralize the undesir-
able effects of private discrimination.47 For the state, the evil of 
race discrimination inheres not in the moral flaw of the individual 
who refuses to sell his home to a Negro; the evil is the deprivation 
which results from the collective refusal of society to sell to 
N egroes.48 If the housing needs of the Negro can be satisfied, the 
continued discrimination by and prejudice of some of the state's 
citizens are no longer a concern of the state, whatever their im-
plications to the theologian or psychiatrist. 
Most of the opposition to state-encouraged interracial housing 
springs from the belief that such activity will endanger other 
41 See, e.g., DAVID, THE HISTORY OF TIIE HAYMARKET AFFAIR (2d ed. 1958). 
42 See, e.g., SMrm, THE AGE OF nm REFORMATION ch. XIII (1920). 
48 For a scholarly and illuminating discussion of the nature of and the interrelation-
ship between prejudice and discrimination, see .All.PORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). 
The answer is not entirely without relevance. Prospects for successful state intervention 
are heightened if it is true that discrimination is the cause of prejudice. 
44 The latter goal seems currently to be the most fashionable. See generally GREEN-
BERG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1-30 and authorities cited in note 17 supra. 
45 Put in such terms the resemblance to the nineteenth century debates between 
utopian and scientific socialism is striking. See, e.g., LAIDLER, A HISTORY OF SOCIALIST 
THOUGHT 136 (1927). 
46 "Radicalism" is used here "in its original and literal sense ••• to characterize an 
attitude of 'going to the root of the matter.' .. POPPER, THE OPEN SoCIETY AND ITS ENE· 
MIES 164 (2d ed. 1952). For an exposition of and attack upon "utopian engineering" and 
a defense of "piecemeal engineering," see id. at 157-68. 
47 The existence of private property is a principal cause of slums, yet the attack by 
the state is on slums, not private property or even greed. Cf. Frank, Social Problems, 30 
AM. J. Soc. 462 (1925). 
48 Cf. Clark, Social Control of Business (1926), in HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
1014 (1938). 
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important values in society. Although it is characteristic of re-
formers to refute such a belief with a sneer, an appreciation of 
its force is necessary before effective and intelligent state action 
can be taken. For unless interracial housing can be achieved 
without serious disruption of the status quo, not only is it safe to 
predict that the institutional forces in sociey which support the 
existing housing pattern will bar effective state intervention, but 
also there is the very serious question whether the state should 
intervene.49 
Among the values most prominently mentioned50 as threatened 
by interracial housing are peaceful race relations,51 stable property 
values,52 social status,53 and community continuity.54 To this 
list perhaps should be added the values of free association and 
free use of private property which are often said to be threatened 
by state coercion in this area.55 In recent years the substantiality 
of such fears has been hotly contested.56 Despite a wealth of in-
formation, all that can be said is that these values need not be 
impaired by the presence of Negroes in a housing area, and under 
certain circumstances, they have not been. But for the foreseeable 
future, these fears are more than chimeras which vanish upon 
confrontation.57 These conclusions are sobering, but they do 
offer hope that under certain conditions interracial housing can 
be achieved without disruption of society. The duty58 of the state 
is to maintain such conditions. 
49 Those who insist that, where the great principle of equal opportunity is involved, 
tawdry values such as property stability are irrelevant may be astute advocates but they 
have little appreciation of history or government. More realistic is the statement: "We 
can ••. continue to blow the trumpet for moral reaffirmations, but unless we can develop 
a program which recognizes the legitimate self-interest of the white communities, we have 
no right to condemn them morally because they refuse to commit hari-kiri." Alinsky, in 
1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 443. 
50 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE Cm,rM'N ON RACE AND HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LlvE 
10-34 (1958); WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETio 214 (1948). 
lS1AnRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 103-37 (1955); WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETIO 97 
(1948). But see GRIER, PRIVATELY DEVELOPED INTERRACIAL HOUSING 194-219 (1960); WILNER, 
WALKLEY & COOK, HUMAN RELATIONS IN INTERRACIAL HOUSING (1955). 
52 See LAURENTI, PROPERTY V ALOES AND RACE (1960); Gillette, A. Study of the Effects 
of Negro Invasion on Real Estate Values, 16 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 151 (1957). 
lS3 For a stinging criticism, see ABRAMS, op. cit. supra note 51, at 137-50. Nevertheless, 
the attitude is basic to society and can not be ignored. See GRIER, op. cit. supra note 51, 
at 78-94; Gruenberg, Dixie Hate in Yankee Suburb, 190 NATION 47 (1960). 
54 WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETIO (1948); 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 376. 
55 Mayer, Russel Woods: Change Without Conflict, in STUDIES IN HOUSING AND MINOR• 
ITY GROUPS 198 (1960). 
56 See authorities cited notes 50 to 54 supra. 
lS7 See, e.g., Dodson, Minority Group Housing in Two Texas Cities, in STUDIES IN 
HOUSING AND MINORITY GROUPS 84, 102 (1960); Mayer, supra note 54. 
58 The "duty" is of course not a constitutional one. See note 8 supra. 
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III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Preliminary studies59 lend support to the following conclusions. 
Some of them can be stated with relative certainty; others are no 
more than tentative hypotheses. All of them need further investi-
gation. The purpose of this comment is not to defend the con-
clusions but, assuming their validity, to examine some of their 
implications for effective state action. 
1. In cities possessing a substantial Negro population, residential 
areas almost inevitably segregate on racial lines.60 White 
residents, primarily as a result of fears of inundation, of decline 
in property values, and of loss of social status, tend to resist 
the intrusion of Negroes, occasionally to the extent of using 
violence. If the conclusion is reached that the Negro is in an 
area to stay, existing pressures in society tend to force that area, 
with varying speed, to become all-Negro.61 
2. However, if the whites are assured that property values will 
remain stable and that they will remain the majority race in the 
area, opposition to living among Negroes diminishes consider-
ably. 62 Many whites are even willing to purchase a home in an 
interracial area if the purchaser believes the house is a good 
bargain and the present racial composition of the area will not 
shift significantly.68 
3. A significant percentage of Negroes desire and are financially 
able to buy housing in the $6,500 to $15,000 range.64 Most 
of these Negroes would prefer interracial housing if the area 
1m See authorities cited in notes 60-66 infra. 
OOWEAVER, THE NEGRO GHEITo (1948); 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 354-74; ABRAMS, 
op. cit. supra note 51, at 1-81; Cohen, The Case for Benign Quotas in Housing, 1960 
PHYLON 20; Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, Scientific American, Oct. 1957, p. 33. 
61 "Integrated" is a term used to describe "the period of time that elapses between 
the appearance of the first Negro and the community's ultimate and total incorporation 
into the Negro ghetto." Alinsky in 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 443. For an excellent 
analysis of the rationality of the white attitudes, see Wolf, The Invasion-Succession Se-
quence as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 13 J. Soc. IssuES 7 (1957). See generally authorities 
cited note 60 supra. 
62 GRIER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 58-77, 156-70; Hyman &: Sheatsley, Attitudes Toward 
Desegregation, Scientific American, Dec. 1956, pp. 35-39; Weaver, Integration in Public 
and Private Housing, 304 ANNALS 86 (1956); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 
6 How. L. J. 30, 34-55 (1960); LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE 57 passim (1960). 
68 RAPKIN &: GRIGSBY, THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING IN RACIALLY MIXED AREAs: A STUDY 
OF THE NATURE OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1960); GRIER, op. cit. supra note 51. 
64 Cole, What is the Federal Government's Role in Housing! in ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN 
NEIGHBORS 348 (1955). In 1950 5.4% of the Negro population had annual incomes of 
$5,000 or more. Id. at 172. 
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has at least a substantial Negro minority and if the Negro is 
assured of being well received.611 
4. The reluctance of most financial institutions, building con-
tractors, and realtors to participate in interracial housing 
springs from a conviction that such participation would not be 
financially profitable and would endanger the values men-
tioned earlier rather than from any morbid hatred of the 
Negro. If interracial housing could be made financially profit-
able and accomplished without threatening established values, 
these groups would respond.66 
If these postulates can be sustained, the state should be able to 
increase the supply of housing available for middle-class Negroes 
by creating a milieu in which: (I) it is financially attractive for 
the prospective white purchaser, and the institutions responsible 
for the building and selling of homes to build, sell, buy, and own 
residential property in an interracial community; (2) it is con-
tinuously possible for the Negro to buy in these areas; and (3) 
finally, it is possible to establish and maintain a stable Negro-white 
ratio67 in the area. 
Little time need be devoted to the first two tasks. The govern-
mental techniques through which they can be accomplished are 
well established and the constitutionality of such techniques is 
beyond question. Although the most helpful examples are pro-
vided by the activity of the federal government, there is no reason 
why the states could not adapt such techniques for their own use or 
cooperate with existing federal agencies. The Housing and Home 
Finance Agency (HHF A) has long sought through financing to 
increase the total supply of homes in the country.68 Certain 
65 Very little statistical data is available as to what percentage of Negroes who could 
afford decent housing would prefer interracial housing to minority housing. Such statistics 
should be collected before a legislature is likely to be induced to act. Nevertheless, the 
authorities in the field are convinced that the statement in the text is true. See, e.g., GRIER, 
op. cit. supra note 51, at 156-59. 
66 ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 150-90 (1955); GRIER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 110-
31; REPORT OF TilE COMM'N ON RACE AND HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE 22-34 (1958). 
67 "Tipping point" is a term much used in current literature to denote the percentage 
of Negroes a community will accept before the white owners will vacate the area. The 
figure is put variously from 20% to 50%. Without accepting the deterministic implications 
of the phrase, the figures are accepted as desirable guides in setting the ratio and resulting 
quotas. The Negro quota should be large enough to permit rapid fulfillment of the 
Negro needs without creating areas of exclusively minority housing. See GRIER, op. cit. 
supra note 51, at 60; Grodzins, supra note 60; Weaver, Integration in Public and Private 
Rousing, 304 ANNALS 86 (1956); Jahoda, Race Relations in Public Rousing, 7 J. Soc. lssol!'S 
132 (1951). 
68 See generally 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 457-505. 
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agencies, such as the Voluntary Home Mortgage Credit Program 
(VHMCP)69 and the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA),70 have been created primarily to aid minority groups 
by furnishing loans which private institutions would not grant. 
There is every indication71 that by lowering the interest rates for 
both the builder and purchaser of interracial housing, sufficient 
response would be forthcoming to solve the housing problem for 
the middle-class Negro.72 Additional governmental tools available 
to spur this type activity would be to guarantee, through insurance 
or subsidy, the success of a builder who undertakes to build inter-
racial housing,73 or to condemn land suitable for residences and 
offer to sell it at a low price to such a builder.74 In arriving at the 
most feasible method of promoting interracial housing, much ex-
perimentation would be needed and many difficult practical prob-
lems would need to be resolved. Without in any way belittling 
such obstacles, they do not present significantly new legal questions 
and further discussion of them is outside the scope of this inquiry. 
The third major task facing the state is to find some means of 
establishing and maintaining a stable Negro-white ratio in the 
planned interracial housing developments. The theoretical pos-
sibilities range from forceful, commune-like relocation of persons 
according to a prescribed plan to hortatory advertising.75 Fre-
quently mentioned as practical and acceptable methods are site-
69 "The realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable 
living environment for every American family •••• " Preamble to the Housing Act of 1949, 
6!1 Stat. 41!1. See generally 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 457-505. 
70 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 492-94. 
71 GruER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 110-!I0; 1959 REPoRT, supra note 6, at 495; Letter 
to author from Morris Milgram, President of Modern Community Developers, Inc. No-
vember 29, 1960. 
72 Still to be resolved, however, is the more challenging problem of the ubiquitous 
slums, 
73 Those who would oppose the use of government funds for a special class, should 
ponder the words of Emil Keen testifying before the Civil Rights Commission: 
"For one, I cannot accept and must reject in advance as unfactual and perhaps 
hypocritical the suggestion that for the federal government to encourage such open-occu-
pancy developments is un-American and class-legislation. I believe such arguments are 
spurious and completely unjustifiable in light of the public policy with regard to housing 
which, for many years, has been giving preference in financing through VA to Armed 
Forces veterans, has been giving preference in financing terms through FHA to moderate-
income families, has been giving preference in housing accommodations through public 
housing to low-income families and has aimed at decent, safe and sanitary housing for all 
American families." 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 496. 
74 The Urban Renewal Program follows this practice at present to improve the inner 
core of the city. See U.S. HOUSING&: HOME FINANCE AGENCY, FEDERAL LAws AUlliORIZING 
AssISTANCE TO URBAN RENEWAL (1959). A different social goal should hardly alter the 
constitutional validity. See Berman v. Parker, !148 U.S. 26 (1954). 
75 For a discussion of the effectiveness of the latter, see, e.g., GRIER, op. cit. supra 
note 51, at 171-81. 
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choosing76 and price-fixing.77 Another plan which has been the 
subject of some controversy in recent years is the use of quotas.78 
This controversy is occasioned in part by a disagreement as to the 
efficacy of quotas, but to a much greater extent it results from a 
basic split as to the constitutionality of a state using race as a cri-
terion to solve a social problem. Examination, if not resolution, of 
these two issues will do much to delimit the proper role of the 
state in the area of race relations. 
To illustrate more clearly how the state might plausibly use 
quotas to increase the supply of new middle-class housing open to 
Negroes and to provide that "impact of actuality"79 thought neces-
sary to carefully reasoned constitutional consideration,80 a hypo-
thetical81 case has been constructed: Developer has received from 
the state a loan at two percent interest sufficient to cover eighty 
percent of the cost of building a 1,000 unit housing development 
at an average cost of $12,000 a unit. The site was acquired through 
the use of the state power of eminent domain. Moreover, the state 
has agreed to purchase at cost all houses which remain unsold 
after a certain date. In return, Developer has promised to sell 
twenty-five percent to thirty-three percent of the houses to Negroes 
in a manner which will achieve substantial integration. To main-
tain this ratio Developer is to acquire from each purchaser an 
option to repurchase should the purchaser desire to sell within 
fifty years. Developer then sold twenty-five percent of the homes 
to Negroes but declined to sell more to Negroes even though at 
the time of refusal 100 homes, subsequently sold to whites, were 
still unsold. Suit is brought by a N egro82 whose offer to purchase 
76 Studies have indicated that the farther a housing development is from an existing 
Negro concentration, the less Negro demand there is. See Navasky, supra note 62, at 38. 
77 It hardly seems necessary to point out that effective Negro demand decreases rapidly 
as the unit price rises. See id. at 39. 
78 GRIER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 38-77; Navasky, supra note 62; Cohen, supra note 
60; 1959 REPORT, supra note 6, at 443-46; Notes, 17 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 540-50 (1959); 70 
YALE L.J. 126 (1960); 35 NoTR.E DAME I.Aw. 563 (1960). 
79 Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HAR.v. L. REv. 1002, 1006 (1924). 
so A "concrete factual setting • • . sharpens the deliberative process. • • ." United 
States v. International Union, UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957). 
81 The hypothetical case draws on two actual litigated cases: Dorsey v. Stuyvesant 
Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (ex• 
tensive state aid given to private developer to build large housing development) and 
Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1960), modified and remanded, 
286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961) (dictum regarding enforceability of first option agreement to 
central Negro-White ratio in private housing development). 
S2Whether the Negro would be financed by the NAACP or a Neighborhood Protec• 
tive Homeowners Association is an open question. It would be naive, however, to ignore 
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a house was rejected. Meanwhile, two years after all the homes 
had been sold, the percentage of Negro owners had risen to thirty 
percent. Consequently, Developer has invoked his option against 
a white homeowner who is moving from the city and who intends 
to sell to a Negro. When the purchaser refuses, Developer brings 
suit to enforce his option, and the owner defends on the ground 
that the option in fact discriminates on the basis of color and is 
thus unenforceable under Shelley v. Kraemer.83 
A determination of the effectiveness of this approach to solve 
the social problem is important both in deciding whether the state 
should take such action and in judging whether the state may. 
While it would be presumptuous to state categorically that such 
action would solve the social problem, there is a large and growing 
body of evidence which suggests a favorable conclusion.84 Since 
space does not permit a review of the evidence the truth of the 
conclusion will arguendo be assumed. 
Further, to facilitate analysis of the central constitutional issue, 
some other substantial legal questions will be avoided by making 
the following assumptions: Developer's refusal to sell to the Negro 
plaintiff involved state action within the meaning of the fourteenth 
amendment.85 The option agreement does not violate the Rule 
Against Perpetuities,86 or constitute an unlawful restraint on alien-
ation.87 Neither the refusal nor the option agreement violates the 
state's anti-bias statute.88 Proof of Developer's intent in refusing 
the offer and invoking the option can be shown. 89 Left for con-
the fact that to challenge state action such as this, tremendous organizational activity 
would be required. See, e.g., VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959). 
83 !1!14 U.S. 1 (1948). 
84' Quotas can create interracial housing. See authorities cited in note 67 supra. Inter-
racial housing is possible. WILNER, WALKLEY &: COOK, HUMAN RELATIONS IN INTERRACIAL 
HOUSING (1955); Weaver, Integration in Public and Private Housing, 304 ANNALS 86 (1956). 
Quotas are necessary. Cohen, The Case for Benign Quotas in Housing, 1960 PHYLON 20. 
Cf. Wolf supra note 61; Rose, Neighborhood Reaction to Isolated Negro Residents, 18 
AM. Soc. REv. 497 (1955); Note, The Reshuffling Phenomenon, 24 AM. Soc. REv. 77 (1959). 
S!i See, e.g., GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 46-61, 295-97. 
86 To see how the Rule has been used in restrictive covenants cases, see Martin, Seg-
regation of Residences of Negroes, 32 MICH. L. REv. 721, 733 (1934). For general applica-
tion of the rule to repurchase options, see SIMES &: SMITH, LAw OF FUTIJRE INTERESTS § 
1154 (2d ed. 1956). 
87 See Martin, supra note 86, at 734-41; Bowman, The Constitution and Common 
Law Restraints on Alienation, 8 B.UL. REv. 1 (1928). SIMES &: SMITH, op. cit. supra note 
86, § 1244. 
ss See Navasky, supra note 62, at 4!1-45. 
89 See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 126, 129-30 (1960). 
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sideration is the question whether the rights of the Negro plain-
tif£90 under the equal protection clause91 of the fourteenth amend-
ment have been infringed by the action of the state. 
IV. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Nation's economic 
and social problems involve "pragmatic issues not appropriate 
for dogmatic solution.''92 Consequently, the Court has, with re-
markably few exceptions, 93 refused to use the equal protection 
clause to invalidate state legislation even where such legislation 
creates classifications which impose unequal burdens on different 
individuals or classes of individuals.94 The Court has not, to be 
sure, relinquished the right to review state legislation.95 It con-
tinues to exist that the criteria used in any classification be 
reasonably designed to accomplish a legitimate purpose of the 
state.96 However, in its readiness to presume the constitutionality 
of all legislative action and to assume any reasonably conceived 
90 The hypothetical situation involved two lawsuits to illustrate how the question 
might be raised. Since the application of the equal protection clause would be the same 
for both, subsequent analysis will assume just one case. 
91 The importance of the due process clause in the area of race relations should not 
be forgotten for it constituted the basis for the Court's rejection of racial zoning in 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Nevertheless, while recognizing that the scope 
of due process and equal protection are not coterminous, Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 
(1921), their application to race relations involves essentially the same considerations and 
for simplicity equal protection alone will be discussed. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954), where the Court invoked the fifth amendment's due process clause to 
declare unconstitutional separate-but-equal school laws in the District of Columbia. See 
also Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judidal Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1959). Finally, frequent reference to due process cases are 
made to draw analogies applicable to equal protection considerations. 
92 AFL v. American Sash &: Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 552 (1949) (concurring opinion 
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). 
93 For cases using equal protection to invalidate state classifications in the economic 
sphere, see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection &: 
Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); 
Gulf, C. &: S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 
540 (1902). See Tussman &: tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 
341 (1949). 
94 Though uttered in dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed the modern judicial 
attitude when be said: "Classification is inherent in legislation; the Equal Protection Clause 
bas not forbidden it. To recognize marked differences that exist in fact is living law; to 
disregard practical differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic." 
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 472 (1957). See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 
(1948); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
95 See cases cited note 93 supra. 
96 See Ransmeier, The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Separate But Equal" Doc• 
trine, 50 MICH. L. REv. 203, 244-47 (1951); Tussman &: tenBroek, supra note 93. 
1961] COMMENTS 1067 
state of facts which would support the presumption,97 the Court 
has declined the opportunity to monitor effectively state regulation 
of its internal economic and social problems.98 
But as the South has learned to its consternation,99 the Supreme 
Court does not exhibit any such docility where the basis of the 
classification is race or color. Any realistic interpretation of the 
equal protection clause must recognize that its historic purpose 
was to condemn "the existence of laws in the states where the 
newly emancipated Negroes resided, which discriminated with 
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class .... "100 Although 
never seriously considered by the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice 
Harlan's expression "badges of servitude"101 tersely describes the 
conditions which the fourteenth amendment was designed to 
eliminate.102 The recent decisions of the Court regarding Negroes 
are perhaps best understood as revealing a belated acceptance by 
the Court of that purpose. For not only has the Court been un-
willing to accept attempted justifications of racial classifications, 
but in expanding considerably the meaning of "state" as used in 
the fourteenth amendment,1°3 as well as in relaxing procedural 
requirements of the party in interest,104 the Court has demon-
strated its basic hostility toward any scheme, whether "accom-
plished ingeniously or ingenuously,"105 which seeks to perpetuate 
race discrimination. Teleology, not neutrality, marks the course 
of fourteenth amendment adjudication.106 
07 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583 (1935). 
os Supreme Court reluctance to use the equal protection clause to control the legis-
lature is generally attributed to "the deference to the political phases of the democratic 
process .••• " KAuPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 190 (1956). 
90 See, e.g., BLOCH, STATES' RIGHTS: THE LAW OF THE LAND (1958), where the author 
develops his case against the Supreme Court's opinions in the race cases by placing the 
opinions in juxtaposition with the Court's opinions rendered in upholding the right of 
the state to regulate economic activities. 
100 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872); Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See generally HARrus, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1960). 
101 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 37 (1883) (dissenting opinion). 
102 Although Justice Harlan was actually interpreting the thirteenth amendment, he 
makes clear that his remarks would apply a fortiori to the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 
37 and 43. 
103 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
10,NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
105Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,132 (1940). 
106 "The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment should be read as 
saying the Negro race, as such, is not to be significantly disadvantaged by the laws of the 
states •••• Segregation is a massive intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race, as such, 
by state law •••. That is all there is to the segregation cases." Black, The Lawfulness of 
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). Compare Miller & Howell, The Myth 
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Such a generalization is quite helpful in so far as it reveals the 
Court's inarticulate major premise. However, a more thorough 
analysis of the cases is necessary to understand how that premise 
has been translated into legal doctrine. 
That the Court will refuse to indulge any presumption in favor 
of the constitutionality of a racial classification is thoroughly es-
tablished.107 Ironically enough, the classic expression of this prin-
ciple was enunciated in a case upholding a racial classification: 
"[A]II legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect .... [C]ourts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny.''108 The principle has been in-
voked many times to nullify "sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination"109 when a complacent court 
might have been content to apply the traditional presumption. 
Although the propriety of adopting such a judicial attitude has 
been questioned with respect to race relations110 as well as the 
first amendment freedoms,1 11 it must be taken into account in 
determining the constitutionality of any legislative proposal. 
More fundamental than its alertness in discovering the "evil 
eye and an unequal hand"112 beneath the law "fair on its face and 
impartial in appearance"113 is the Court's express rejection, as a 
justification for racial discriminations, of values whose preserva-
tion has traditionally been regarded as vindicating the existence 
of the state itself. To an assertion that a racial zoning law was en-
acted to preserve the public peace by preventing racial conflicts, 
the Court responded: "Desirable as this is, and important as is 
the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accom-
of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661 (1960) with Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959), and Pollak, 
supra note 91. 
101 The same attitude is evident in the cases involving first amendment freedoms. 
"[T]he usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given 
in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the first 
amendment .... That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting 
dubious intrusions." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). See also Murdock. 
v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette), 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 
558, 562 (1948). See generally Givens, The Impartial Constitutional Principlt:s Supporting 
Brown v. Board of Education, 6 How. L.J. 179 (1960). 
10s Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Oyama v. California, 332 
U.S. 633 (1948); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
109 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). 
110 HAND, THE BILL OF Rtcms (1958); Wechsler, supra note 106. 
111 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter); Kauper, The First Ten Amendments, 37 A.B.A.J. 717 (1951). 
112Yick. Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). 
118 Id. at 373. , 
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plished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or pro-
tected by the federal constitution."114 A like reply has met the 
state's contention that the purpose of its classification was to protect 
property values115 and natural resources,11 6 to increase fire and 
health safety,117 and to enforce historic legal rights.118 Of late only 
the "pressing public necessity" of wartime security has been suffi-
cient to warrant sustaining a racial classification.119 It must be 
appreciated, however, that in each case condemning the classifica-
tion, the effect of the classification was to place the minority at 
a substantial disadvantage. The Court has not yet been forced to 
decide a case where the effect of the classification is materially to 
benefit the minority group.120 
An insistence on the absolute political equality of every indi-
vidual is another concept which is conspicuously evident in the 
race cases. Where political rights and privileges are concerned, 
noblesse oblige is as much to be condemned as discrimination. 
"The basis of selection cannot consciously take color into account. 
Such is the command of the Constitution."121 In such cases the 
Court seems far more concerned with paying homage to the axioms 
of representative government than it is with gauging the practical 
consequences a result would have on the minority. For example, it 
could reasonably be argued that a Negro would receive a fairer 
trial if a certain number of his race served as jurors. Yet the Court 
has held that not only is proportional representation not re-
quired,122 it is not permitted.123 On the other hand, while a mere 
114 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917). 
111, Id. at 82. 
116 Takahashi v. Fish&: Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
117Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
118 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l (1948). 
119 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
120 It is true that the Court has held that a state may constitutionally "strike at the 
discrimination inherent in the quota system." Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 467 
(1950). Although some observers have suggested the case stands for the proposition that 
quotas are unconstitutional (Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 709 (N.D. 
Ill. 1960), modified and remanded, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961)), such a conclusion is 
hardly justified. In the first place, the state prohibited only stranger picketing the object 
of which was to force a department store to hire on a proportional basis. The Court 
specifically limited the holding to the "circumstances of the case" and warned that 
"generalizations are treacherous." Hughes v. Superior Court, supra at 469. More impor-
tantly the decision purported only to uphold the right of the state to bar quotas. It made 
quite clear that if the state had decided to leave the "conflicting interests ..• unregulated" 
there would have been no constitutional objection to the quota system involved in the 
case. Hughes v. Superior Court, supra at 468. 
121 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 295 (1950) (concurring opinion). 
122 Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945). 
123 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,287 (1950). 
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showing of the possible use of color as a criterion for selecting 
jurors will vitiate the trial,124 if the state is able effectively to ex-
clude Negroes from jury duty by selecting jurors only from the tax 
assessment roles,125 condemnation is heard only in dissent.126 This 
type of analysis has been frequently employed where the issue con-
cerned the right to a fair trial,127 to sit on a jury128 or to vote.129 
In these areas of what might be called political rather than social 
rights, Harlan's plea for a color-blind Constitution appear to be 
realized.13O However, it has been suggested that with the decision 
in Brown and its per curiam application,131 the Supreme Court 
has clearly indicated an intent to apply this rationale to all state 
activities in the field of race relations. In short, it is asserted that 
now "all classification by race is unconstitutional per se.''132 Al-
though the nobility of the aspiration and the simplicity of the ap-
plication make such an extension attractive, neither the opinion 
nor the holdings seem to warrant such a conclusion. 
Something can be said for the more rational expressions of the 
separate-but-equal doctrine as promulgated by southern apol-
ogists133 - but not within the framework of a political philosophy 
which rejects a caste-oriented society. In holding that a state could 
not consciously segregate individuals on the basis of color, the Su-
preme Court accepted in 1954 what it would not in 1898: "Seg-
regation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
124Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). 
125 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 467-77 (1953). 
126 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 554 (1953) (dissenting opinion). 
127 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); 
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); See GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 31!1-42. 
128 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Cassell 
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). 
120 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949); Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). See generally 
GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 133-53. 
130 See Watt & Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 !LL. L. 
REv. 13 (1949). 
131 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (municipal transportation system); Holmes 
v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf course); Mayor & City Council v. 
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public bathing beaches); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical 
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (city amphitheater and park facilities); Florida ex rel. Hawkins 
v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (higher education). 
132 BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAw 145 (1957). See to the same 
effect KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 219 (1956); Currie & Schreter, Un-
constitutional Discrimination in the Conflicts of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L 
REv. 1, 5 n.29 (1960); Black, The Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 
423 (1960). In fairness to the authors cited, it should be noted they were addressing 
themselves to the various applications of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. 
133 See, e.g., Waring, The Southern Case Against Desegregation, Harpers, Jan. 1956, 
p. 39. 
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detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is 
greater when it has the sanction of the law: for the policy of sep-
arating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority 
of the Negro group."134 Whatever doubts the limiting phrase 
"children in public school" may have raised as to the breadth of 
the Brown decision135 were quickly dissipated by a series of per 
curiam opinions invalidating segregation legislation in a host of 
situations.136 Separate-but-equal in any form no longer has "the 
sanction of the law." The ratio decidendi of the decisions, how-
ever, was not the irrationality per se of using race as a basis of 
classification; rather it was the conclusion as a matter of law that 
a racial classification which results in the separation of the races is 
arbitrary.137 Such a rationale militates against holding as neces-
sarily arbitrary a racial classification designed to encourage inte-
gration. Certainly, to insist cavalierly that the issue is foreclosed 
is untenable. 
There is little point in laboring this question, for whatever the 
decision on the constitutionality of racial quotas in private housing, 
stare decisis will not be the controlling factor.138 Rather, the Su-
preme Court must once again undergo the painful process of 
balancing conflicting values in American society.139 It must decide 
whether the principle of equal protection may be realized only by 
a state which maintains a strict laissez-faire rectitude in every as-
pect of race relations, or whether it may also be realized by a state 
which seeks to intervene in society to alleviate the lot of the un-
fortunate minority even if such intervention requires the making 
of racial distinctions. 
The proposition that "race [is] an irrational premise for gov-
ernment action"140 seems to rest upon two widely held beliefs. 
One is that racial classifications are so susceptible to abuse that 
only by exorcising all such classifications can the abuses be pre-
13i Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494. See Comment, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
136 (1960). 
135 See, e.g., Kauper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 52 MICH. L. REv. II37, II53 (1954). 
136 See note 131 supra. 
137 "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper govern-
mental objective ...• " Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). See generally Black, 
supra note 132. 
138 See generally Miller &: Howell, supra note 106. 
130 Cf. Kauper, Trends in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.RD. 155, 181 (1959). 
"The Court in the end chooses the values and interests that it thinks are important under 
the Constitution and behind which it will push its weight." 
140 Brief for Appellants on Reargument, p. 23, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), in GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 43. 
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vented. The other is that since the Negro possesses full political 
and civil equality any restraint placed upon him merely because 
of his color is an arbitrary interference with his rights as an in-
dividual. 
The assertion that racial classifications should be unconstitu-
tional per se because a more flexible standard can too easily become 
an instrument to limit rather than expand the opportunities of 
the minority group merits serious consideration.141 With respect 
to the question of quotas in housing, the fear is expressed that 
either the principle would be abused to perpetuate the existing seg-
regation, or changed circumstances would render inequitable a 
quota which initially may have been beneficial. 
In recent dictum one lower federal court judge indicted all 
quotas in the following manner: "If a population quota of 80 to 
20 ... is constitutional, then a quota of . . . 99 to I . . . would be 
constitutional and Shelley v. Kraemer ... would be circumvent-
ed."142 Although hardly subtle, such language is a clear reminder 
of the danger that inheres in any relaxation of dogma. Because of 
"the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its 
logic,"143 it can not be said to be an altogether idle fear. Neverthe-
less, it bespeaks both a lack of understanding of the nature of the 
housing problem and an unwarranted implication of impotence 
on the part of the judiciary. 
In states now opposed to the principle of integration, token 
integration is probably regarded with as much repugnance as total 
integration.144 Moreover, there are already means in society suffi-
cient to maintain segregation in housing which are either consti-
tutional or if unconstitutional are not subject to effective monitor-
ing.145 Under such circumstances devices which would encourage 
at least limited integration are not likely to be embraced widely. 
Furthermore, even states which purport to favor the principle of 
141 Many observers have concluded such a possibility warrants rejection of all quotas. 
See Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 29, 65 (1960); McGhee &: 
Ginger, The House I Live In, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 194, 249 (1961); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 126, 
133 (1960). 
142 Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1960), modified and 
remanded, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961), discussed in Note, 70 YALE L.J. 126 (1960). 
143 CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921), cited in Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson). 
144 See, e.g., MARTIN, THE DEEP SOUTH SAYS NEVER (1957). 
145 For methods available to private organizations, see Comment, Constitutional Law: 
Circumvention of the Rule Against Enforcement of Racially Restrictive Covenants, 37 
CALIF. L. REv. 493; ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 150-90 (1955). For methods available 
to local governing bodies, see id. at 205-27; GRIER, PRIVATELY DEVELOPED INTERRACIAL 
HOUSING 78-94 (1960). 
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integration have been unable to cope effectively with those forces 
in society which in fact create a segregated housing pattern.146 
Finally, it must be appreciated that in these latter states, the state 
authority responsible for promoting interracial housing is not likely 
to condone sham quotas.147 Indeed, is it too much to suggest that 
in light of the Supreme Court's well-known sensitivity to racial 
classifications that in the future those who would in fact discrimi-
nate against Negroes will not be so careless as to use color as the 
obstensible criterion?148 
Objection must also be raised to the implication that if the 
Supreme Court approves the quota in the hypothetical case, stare 
decisis or judicial ineptitude would lead to approval of a sham 
quota. When a similar proposition was advanced with regard to 
the power to tax, Mr. Justice Holmes dissented in language which 
is apposite here: "Most distinctions of the law are distinctions of 
degree .... The power to tax is not the power to destroy while 
this Court sits."149 The reports are replete with cases which dem-
onstrate the vitality of Holmes' aphorism.urn Although the Court 
has consistently recognized its duty to draw such distinctions in 
determining the constitutionality of all state and federal action,151 
such an attitude has especial relevance where the case involves an 
issue subject to "the most rigid scrutiny."152 Here the slightest 
variance from an approved standard invites denunciation.153 
146 See discussion note 17 supra. 
147 It must be remembered that what is here sought to be upheld as constitutional is 
the right of the state to permit quotas, not the right of the individual to insist on them. 
148 Greenberg says present discriminatory statutes use "Aesopian terms." GREENBERG, 
op. cit. supra note 4, at 19. 
140 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 224 (1928) (dissenting opinion). 
1110 The constitutional history of milk regulation provides a good illustration. In 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Supreme Court sustained the right of the 
state to regulate the milk industry as a proper exercise of the police power. Then in 
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 499 (1935), the Court held such regulation was 
not permissible if it burdened interstate commerce. Yet in Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg 
Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939), the Court upheld the state's regulation while recognizing 
such regulations did impose incidental burdens on interstate commerce. Then in H. P. 
Hood 8c Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), the Court held a state's police power 
could not sanction refusing a license to a dealer in interstate commerce in order to protect 
local markets. Finally, the Court held in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 
(1951), that a state regulation was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce 
even though it conceded that had there not been other means available to protect the 
public health which interfered less with interstate commerce, the Court would have sus• 
tained the regulation in question. 
1111 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
1112 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
11!3 Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), with Feiner v. New York, 
340 U.S. 315 (1951), and compare Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 
(1948), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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Related to the abuse argument, but perhaps more disturbing, 
is the argument that if a quota is upheld because initially it helps 
the Negro, changed circumstances may make it "a strait jacket.''15i 
Such a change may either be a percentage increase in the Negro 
population of the state so that the initial quota could not ab-
sorb all of the Negroes desiring housing,155 or an improvement 
in the relative economic and social position of the minority group 
so that except for the quota the minority would be able to find 
adequate housing wherever he wants it.156 While recognizing that 
the obvious solution to either eventuality is legislative correction, 
it should not be thought that the judiciary is helpless to provide 
relief under the Constitution. A classification results in dissimilar 
treatment of individuals. Such difference is justified only if the 
purpose is to promote the general welfare and if the classification 
used is appropriate to accomplish that purpose.157 Even if the 
classification in question originally accomplished that result, if 
circumstances change so that it later had the opposite effect, the 
classification would become arbitrary and hence unconstitution-
al.158 Such is the rationale by which the Court would be able to 
declare unconstitutional a quota previously sustained. To so argue 
is not to approve what Mr. Justice Roberts has called "good for 
this day and train only"159 constitutional law, but it is merely to 
recognize that "reasonableness" of state action is meaningless with-
out reference to the social context.160 
Whether the ultimate justification for individual rights is con-
ceived as natural, historical, or axiological, its importance in Amer-
ican juris-political thought is beyond question.161 The voting 
154 Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 707 (N .D. Ill. 1960), modified 
and remanded, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). 
155"Had a [quota] •.• been adopted in Chicago twenty years ago-when the Negro 
population was nearer IO than to 20% of the whole - today's Negro population of that 
city would be hard put to find homes there." Id. at 708. 
156 "[A]fter years of limited opportunity to purchase adequate housing, [Negroes] 
may require a greater percentage of new housing than their numbers in the community 
would indicate." Note, 70 YALE L.J. 126, 132 (1960). 
157 See text accompanying notes 92-98 supra. 
158 Compare Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909), with Newton v. 
Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165 (1922) (rate regulations), and compare Block v. 
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), with Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924) (rent 
controls). See generally Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 474 (1957) (dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter). 
159 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (dissenting opinion). 
160 See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). 
161 See, e.g., Harvey, The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective, 59 Mica. L. REv. 
487 (1961); Harvey, The Challenge of the Rule of Law, id. at 603. 
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privilege, the substantive freedoms of speech, religion, and press 
as well as the procedural due process requirements reflect an im-
mense concern for the dignity of the individual.162 Although the 
formulation and protection of these rights has long been regarded 
as the special function of the Court, the last decades have seen the 
Court more than ever "intent on preserving the dignity and free-
dom of the individual by asserting his [right] . . . to have a voice 
in the determination of affairs and to be free from arbitrary inter-
ference with his personal liberty."163 It would be foolish, there-
fore, to dismiss as rhetoric Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's dictum in 
Shelley v. Kraemer: "The rights established [by the fourteenth 
amendment] are personal rights. . . . Equal protection of the laws 
is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.164 
Although the immediate target of Vinson's ·wrath was the caviling 
suggestion that racial restrictive covenants were not a denial of 
equal protection because the state courts stood ready to enforce 
covenants excluding whites, there is the unmistakable conclusion 
that even legitimate "legislative efforts to deal ·with obstinate 
social issues"165 can not ignore the individual. 
The individual personal right166 of a Negro to contract with 
other persons for the purchase of land wherever he desires is an 
important consideration, but perspective is needed to prevent 
using the expression to pervert the ideal. The Negro's "liberty 
of contract" is meaningless without a willing seller. To use the 
principle to render unenforceable restrictive covenants which have 
the effect of restricting the Negro to a limited and segregated area 
may be sound,167 but to invoke it to prevent the growth of inter-
racial housing which is the sine qua non of any realistic right is to 
expound the same wooden logic present in the Supreme Court 
opinions invalidating economic legislation in the first part of the 
twentieth century. 
162 See cases collected in 2 FREUND, SUTIIERLAND, HOWE &: BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LA.w (1954). 
163 Kauper, Trends in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155, 180 (1959). 
lM 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). See also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950); McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950); Missouri ex 
rel, Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938). 
165 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,262 (1952). 
166 Care should be taken not to confuse the individual restraint or injury which must 
be shown in order to invoke the judicial process, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), 
and Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1935) (concurring opinion), with that which 
must be shown to demonstrate the arbitrary nature of the state action, Nixon v. Herndon, 
273 U.S. 536 (1927). Even where the "preferred freedoms" are involved, the two are not 
the same. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
167 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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In Adair v. United States,168 the Supreme Court overturned a 
legislative attempt to outlaw "yellow dog" contracts. Speaking ex 
cathedra Mr. Justice Harlan held: "The right of a person to sell 
his labor upon such terms as he deems proper, is, in its essence, 
the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the 
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person 
offering to sell it .... [T]he employer and employee have equality 
of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbi-
trary interference with the liberty of contract, which no govern-
ment can legally justify in a free land."169 
Similarly, in Lochner v. New York170 the Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional, as an infringement on liberty of contract, 
a maximum hour statute for bakers. The Court thought it self-
evident that since "bakers as a class are ... equal in intelligence and 
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations"171 it fol-
lowed that they are therefore "able to assert their rights ... with-
out the protecting arm of the state, interfering with their independ-
ence of judgment and of action."172 Although the conclusion has 
long been recognized as a non sequitur when applied to bakers, the 
same reasoning maintains an amazing tenaciousness when applied 
to Negroes. 
In each case the syllogism rests upon the laissez-faire belief that 
restrictions upon or protection of certain individuals or classes in 
society is a negation of their political and civil equality.173 When 
the Court advanced a similar proposition to invalidate a statute 
establishing minimum wages for women,174 the caustic rebuke of 
one critic clearly revealed the tenuousness in language which loses 
none of its cogency applied to racial classifications: 
"Will the learned justices of the majority be pardoned for 
overlooking the cardinal fact that minimum wage legislation 
168 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
169 Id. at 174-75. 
110 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
171Jd. at 57. 
172Jbid. 
173E.g., "In view of the great-not to say revolutionary-changes which have taken 
place . . • in the contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in the 
nineteenth amendment, ..• these differences [the ancient inequality of the sexes] have 
now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point ..•• [Therefore] we cannot accept 
the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to re-
strictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case 
of men under similar circumstances." Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 553, 
(1923). 
174Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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is not and never was predicated upon political, contractual or 
civil inequalities of women? It is predicated rather upon evils 
to society, resulting from the exploitation of women in indus-
try, who as a class labor under a tremendous economic handi-
cap. The problem is one of economic fact, not of political, 
contractual or civil status. "175 
The retreat from the attitude prevalent in these early opinions 
of the Court is too familiar to need elaboration.176 At least since 
the middle thirties the Court has not been willing to overturn 
comprehensive social and economic regulation merely because it 
can be shown, for example, that an individual woman is unable 
to work because no one is willing to pay her the minimum wage,177 
or that an individual worker is barred from making a contract to 
work for higher pay than that provided by a collective bargaining 
agreement.178 This retreat did not occur because the Court lost 
interest in individual rights. Rather, it occurred because the Court 
was willing at least to tolerate the political philosophy that the 
individual rights of those most in need of protection would best 
be realized by state intervention.179 
The extended reference to the changed judicial attitude toward 
economic problems is not to suggest that the problems created by 
racial discrimination are identical. It is intended, however, to illus-
trate the danger of making the facile assumption that the myriad 
problems created by race discrimination can be resolved by a 
simple formula. Specifically, it is intended to suggest that in deter-
mining the reasonableness of state interference with individual 
freedom, it is as unrealistic to assume that the housing problem 
created by race discrimination is simply a question of a Negro's 
right to buy a house on a particular lot as it is to assume that the 
nation's economic problem is a question of two "farmers haggling 
over the sale of a horse.''180 
William C. Griffith, S.Ed. 
175 Comment, 11 CALIF. L. REv. 353, 357 (1922). See Frankfurter, Hours of Labor 
and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HAR.v. L. REv. 353 (1916); Powell, The Judiciality 
of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HAR.v. L. REv. 545, 553-73 (1924). 
176 See, e.g., 1WON, THE SUPREME CoURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN (1958). 
177West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
178 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
170 For an early exposition of such a philosophy, see Hale, Labor Legislation as an 
Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 AM. LAB. LEG. REv. 155 (1925). For a contemporary 
view, see Rosrow, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM (1959). 
180 Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). 
